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Abstract. Modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), implement capabilities 
that have contributed significantly to patient outcomes, as well as quality of life. 
The ever increasing connectivity of IMD’s does raise security concerns though 
there are instances where implemented security measures might impact on patient 
safety. The paper discusses challenges of addressing both of these attributes in 
parallel.  
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Introduction 
Implantable medical devices, or IMDs, are widely used to improve patient outcomes in 
presence of numerous conditions as well as contribute to the quality of life. They also 
enable authorised medical staff to extract useful data regarding the health of the patient 
for a given period of time. Modern versions of IMDs increasingly offer many of their 
functions, based on software implementation (e.g. software control of pacemakers). 
Use of software has also enabled medical device manufacturers to offer more complex 
functions, as well as features that increase the usability of the device. For example, 
wireless control of the device, mobile based interfaces, bluetooth enabled data 
collection, as well as automated update of the software, without the need for a special 
procedure. IMDs pose numerous challenges to developers with regard to their safety 
(i.e. harm to patient) as well as security (i.e. breach of privacy, device malfunction due 
to malicious attacks etc.). Safety of the devices is an intuitive attribute, as an IMD 
operating in an unintended way, may cause direct harm to the patient. Furthermore, 
security attacks to the patient can result in loss of privacy of the patient (e.g. loss of 
their data) or loss of control of the device, which could effectively lead to unintended 
operation of the IMD. There are numerous reports from researchers, who have 
managed to breach the security of an IMD [1]. Although the benefits from using IMDs 
currently far outweigh security risks the ever-increasing connectivity of IMDs will 
make them vulnerable to potentially more subtle security attacks. There are still 
security challenges to be overcome to address contemporary security risks  [2] with one 
of the more complex issues being where the design of security measures might be in 
conflict with safety requirements to the possible detriment of patient health [3].   
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      This contribution examines some of the trade-offs between safety and security in 
IMD’s – one of the intentions being to increase awareness where ‘design for security’ 
might impact the patient safety. The approach to identifying the challenges included a 
digital library search, as well as review of the main standards applicable to IMDs. The 
authors picked a representative sample from the results, based on their experience. The 
literature used the keywords “implanted + medical + device + security” and “'security + 
medical device + safety”. The papers were reviewed by the authors for examples or 
discussion on the interaction between security design features. 
1. Regulatory Frameworks and Implanted Medical Devices 
IMDs fall in Class III type of medical devices as defined in the classification procedure 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, (usually known as 21 CFR 860) [4] and Council 
Directive 93/42/EEC on Medical Devices [5]. Class III type of devices are expected to 
support or sustain human life since they are designed to prevent impairment of human 
health. As stated in [6], the ability of software to implement complex functionality that 
cannot be implemented at reasonable cost in hardware, makes new kinds of medical 
devices possible. IMDs, are becoming increasingly pervasive, with current 
developments being propelled by the ever-increasing capability of processing power, 
energy efficiency along with power system optimisations [7]. Furthermore, 
technological advances in ultra-low-power wireless connectivity [8] and the 
development of numerous lightweight communication protocols [9] have also helped 
connecting IMDs with the outside world. All these put together have made it possible 
to provide real-time monitoring and treatment of patients [10]. With the technology 
mature enough, it’s now necessary to consider safety along with security. FDA has 
recently called for manufacturers to address cybersecurity issues relevant to medical 
devices from the initial design phase through deployment and end-of-life [11]. FDA's 
guidance document, does not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. However it 
describes FDA’s intentions on the matter of security in medical devices. As stated in 
the document: “The extent to which security controls are needed will depend on the 
medical device, its environment of use, the type and probability of the risks to which it 
is exposed, and the probable risks to patients from a security breach”. The document 
points out that devices that are connecting to another medical device, or the internet / 
network are more vulnerable to cybersecurity. It also defines cybersecurity as “the 
process of preventing unauthorized modification, misuse or denial of use, or the 
unauthorized use of information that is stored, accessed, or transferred from a medical 
device to an external recipient.”. According to FDA, cybersecurity is a shared 
responsibility between stakeholders and failure to address it could lead to compromised 
device functionality and loss of data. These calls consist draft guidelines for ensuring 
appropriate medical device security. Nevertheless there is evidence these guidelines 
will be used by the FDA as grounds for rejection of premarket medical device 
submissions [2]. Keven Fu in [12] states that the problems in medical device software 
result largely from a failure to apply well-known systems engineering techniques thus 
compromising properties such as safety, effectiveness, usability, dependability, 
reliability, security, and privacy.  
   
 
   
 
2. IMD Design Trade-offs 
IMD design process should be based on well-founded security practices to build 
trustworthy systems. In order to achieve this, designers must consider security in early 
design stages aiming at encrypting sensitive data where possible. Furthermore, security 
should be integrated in such a way to improve safety. Current security threads have 
been identified as: telemetry interface, software and hardware. The telemetry interface 
threats, which are typically wireless could be subjected to eavesdropping, jamming, 
interference etc. Software threats, involve access to sensitive information and 
modification of the logic of the system to affect its operation. Hardware threats involve 
physical attacks as well as remote attacks caused by an insecure telemetry interface. 
E.g. there could be unnecessary triggering of the IMD to constantly transmit its 
readings, thus depleting its battery. Telemetry interface threats can be addressed by 
employing advanced radio interference mitigation techniques to prevent accidental or 
intentional interference with the IMDs. Wireless Medical Telemetry Systems (WMTS) 
[13] and Medical Device Radio-communications Service (MedRadio) [14] radio bands 
are shared between various radio systems raising concerns about the consequences on 
the operation of IMDs or medical devices in general. Issues such as jamming, have 
been addressed in literature [15] through anti-jamming mechanisms. Software threats 
can be possibly addressed by employing highly secure encryption mechanisms such 
IMDGuard [16], OPFKA [17] tested for security flaws in [18] – all aiming at protecting 
access of personal health information.  Fu and Blum in [19] state that poor security 
design could open the backdoor to malware on network medical devices, resulting in 
unreliable data or actuation, impacting both the integrity and availability of the systems 
in question. Using traditional cryptographic techniques and protocols in IMDs may be 
inappropriate due to the limited capabilities of the devices [20]. Hardware threats (apart 
from physical abuse) can be addressed in a similar way to the telemetry threats since 
such threats usually involve remote attacks and alteration of sensor data.  
3. Systematising safety and security analysis 
Future IMDs, are expected to provide numerous functions that will contribute to patient 
outcomes, such as their safety as well as quality of life. Safety and security (as well as 
other attributes) can be in conflict. Reconciling these conflicts requires making trade-
offs, by identifying the optimum balance in terms of relative security and safety risk. 
Integrating security in the product development / safety lifecycle is imperative for 
making future networked type of IMDs safe and secure. According to [11], the 
manufacturer’s approach should appropriately address the following elements: 
Identification of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities; assessment of the impact of threats 
and vulnerabilities on device functionality and end users/patients; Assessment of the 
likelihood of a threat and of a vulnerability being exploited; Determination of risk 
levels and suitable mitigation strategies and finally Assessment of residual risk and risk 
acceptance criteria. Although safety and security are two distinct attributes, realising 
that they can be interdependent, has resulted in unified approaches for, analysing and 
designing them as well as reconciling conflicts amongst them [21]. 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
4. Conclusions 
IMDs implement capabilities that have contributed significantly to patient outcomes, as 
well as quality of life. Some of these capabilities such as wireless connectivity, pose a 
possible security threat. This work has highlighted the fact that safety and security (as 
well as other attributes) can be in conflict. With numerous reports on bridge of security 
on various IMDs, it is imperative that IMDs address safety as well as security 
requirements, by employing unified approaches for, analysing and designing them as 
well as reconciling conflicts amongst them. 
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